The PhD and Knowledge

The PhD is defined in terms of knowledge, e.g. “The degree is awarded to candidates who, through original investigation, make a distinct and significant contribution to knowledge.” (UTS, 2006). That new knowledge is expected to have two characteristics: it is shared and it can be verified or challenged. So a PhD describes knowledge that is new (in the world), can be shared with others and can be tested in some way. Accepting that much of what we know is known tentatively rather than absolutely, the properties of being sharable and challengeable are more important than the absolute certain truth of the new knowledge.   

There are a few knowledge issues that are worth mentioning but are not, in fact, relevant in our context. In each case, of-course, the issues could be the subject of a PhD in Philosophy itself.  

·       Tacit knowledge

That we have achieved new implicit or tacit knowledge is clearly not relevant because, by definition, it is not shared.   

·       Subjective or private knowing

Any position that argues that knowledge is private to an individual argues that knowledge cannot be shared and so rules against the possibility of research in the PhD sense.

·       Pure argumentation

The new knowledge can be that B follows from A. In other words, it is shown that, presuming (but not claiming) that A is true, then B must be true also. Such an argument does not appeal to any facts about the world but relies entirely on the strength of its argument. This is not a matter of rhetoric, it has to be a matter of logic. In mathematics, for example, such PhDs are common. The crucial issue is to show that the system of reasoning used and the assumptions A do not contain or imply a contradiction. That can be quite hard. Reaching into the philosophical foundations, however, is a serious matter, not least because of Gödel’s theorem (Gödel, 1931). In any case, a PhD based upon pure argumentation cannot be practice-based.

Knowledge

A classic text is A. J. Ayer’s “The Problem of Knowledge”. He argues, pragmatically, that we needed to find a “right to be sure” to support a belief in order to call it knowledge (Ayer,1956). It is a matter of debate how strong the backing needs to be for a believer to have the right to be sure that their belief is true. However, The setting of a standard requiring the impossibility of error should be resisted. His view was that one has the right to “be sure” even where error is possible.  

A huge influence has been Karl Popper’s view of a “right to be sure” expressed in his description of scientific enquiry (Popper, 1959). His key point is that we cannot know any general truth about the world for sure. Many, Bertrand Russell for example Russell, 1912), have pointed out that we can only observe a finite number of events and that, for all we know, the next observation will contradict any theory we have based on the earlier ones. Thus Popper argued that the pursuit of new knowledge was based on attempting to falsify our current hypotheses or beliefs. The longer we go on failing to falsify them the more we can claim the right to be sure about them. Once falsified, we need to find a new or modified theory. The main thing is to be open to, and even invite, criticism and attempts to disprove our theories. 

Much of the understanding about having knowledge rests upon what it is that we perceive in the world and that others also report perceiving. The problem is that, of-course, we have direct knowledge of what are often called “sense data” (Swartz, 1965) but only indirect knowledge of the world through those data. A significant stance in this context is constructivism (not to be confused with movements of the same name in art and in mathematics) (Bruner, 1986).  In this view, in our pursuit of knowledge about the world we construct it rather than uncover it. One might argue that “being sure” is about being sure that it is plausible rather than that it is true. 

Beyond knowing what is we are also interested in what causes or influences what is. David Hume’s work is classic here (Hume, 1777). He articulated the  “problem of induction”. Basically, we can never be sure that X causes Y because we cannot reliably induce the general case from specific instances  (as above). However, he gave a valuable lesson in how to deal with such philosophical problems. He said that we had to rely on such induction in ordinary life or we would “perish and go to ruin.” So some philosophical problems about knowledge may be intractable or devastating, but we must carry on anyway. After all, despite the problem of induction, for example, we can boil a kettle, send an email and ride a bicycle.

Beyond knowing what is and knowing what causes what, we are also interested in knowledge about action. We are clearly able to find new knowledge about how to better achieve some end. Practical knowledge of this kind can still be shared, verified and criticised. ‘Knowledge how’ may not, however, provide the degree of explanation that ‘knowledge that’ does. The problem of induction is less of a concern. The action researcher might generate new knowledge about how to do something but leave it open to others to discover why it works. A phenomenologist might argue that this ‘knowing how’ precedes ‘knowing that’. From that point of view, action research should come before experimental research. Until the action research is complete, it could be argued, we do not know what to study experimentally. If we were starting from a clean sheet of zero knowledge, perhaps that would be true, but reality is more complex.  

Phenomenology (Lewis, 1946) has a number of strands, but one important concept is that, to put it very briefly, the body is important in perception. In practical terms, this implies that the typical theories of cognitive science may be fatally lacking. A reliable account of perception must take action into account. Further, one can argue that action, cognition and perception must be considered together in any adequate description. If we accept this view, then research about human interaction with art works, for example, must try to capture information about all three aspects and unify them in some way.  

Frederick Crews put the point about how to approach knowledge nicely. He said that we should follow “the ethic of respecting that which is known, acknowledging what is still unknown and acting as if one cared about the difference” (Crews, 2006). Finally, a lighter read on writing about these topics is Francis Wheen’s  “How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World” (Wheen, 2004). Chapter four, called “The Demolition Merchants of Reality” should be required reading for any PhD candidate.

References

Arts and Humanities Research Board (2000). Guide to the Research Grant Scheme. http://www.ahrb.ac.uk/research/grant/guide.htm [accessed July 2000]

Ayer, A.J. (1956). The Problem of Knowledge, Macmillan Press, London.

Bruner, J. (1986). Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Crews, F. (2006). Follies of the Wise, Shoemaker and Hoard. Emeryville, CA.

Gödel, K. (1931). Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, I. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38: 173-98. Translated in Jean van Heijenoort, 1967. From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book on Mathematical Logic. Harvard University Press: pp 596-616

Gödel’s theorem: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_incompleteness_theore

Hockey, J. Art and Design Practice-Based Research Degree Supervision. Arts & Humanities in Higher Education. vol 2(2) 173–185.

Hume, D. (1777) An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Beauchamp, T. L. (ed.), (1999), Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hume, D. ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume

Lewis, C. I. (1946) An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Open Court, USA.

Popper, K. R. (1959 – English translation) The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002) Routledge, London.

Russell, B., A., W. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, Williams and Norgate, London

Scrivener, S.A.R (2002). The Art Object Does Not Embody a Form of Knowledge, Working Papers in Art and Design, http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes1/research/papers/wpades/vol2/scrivenerfull.htm

Stringer, E.T (2003) Action Research in Education, Prentice Hall. 

Swartz, R., J. (ed.) (1965) Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing. Doubleday, New York.

UTS (2006). Doctor of Philosophy, University of Technology, Sydney. http://www.handbook.uts.edu.au/it/pg/c02029.html

Wheen, F (2004). How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World, Harper, London.